Showing posts with label nation-states. Show all posts
Showing posts with label nation-states. Show all posts

Monday, March 23, 2020

Re-Examining An Old Tenet Of The Free Economy

     “When the facts change, I change my mind. What do you do, sir?” – attributed to John Maynard Keynes, possibly apocryphal

     Changes in circumstances bring about changes in convictions, and why shouldn’t they? If our understanding follows from the evidence before us, and that evidence is later shown to be inaccurate or incomplete, to re-examine our previous beliefs is the only rational course.

     Some people refuse to do that. They retain their undermined – sometimes utterly refuted – prior stances with a quasi-religious tenacity. They become vitriolic when challenged on them. It can make things rather difficult for their relatives, friends, and occupational colleagues.

     Consider, however superficially, the requirements for fielding an army – a meaningful army, that can actually fight. What does such an effort require?

  • Men;
  • Mobility;
  • Munitions.

     Now, those are very broad categories. For example, the “men” category would include many specimens I wouldn’t want in a field army: men too old to fight; men too small or weak to fight; men disinclined (whether from allegiance or self-centeredness) to defend their country; men incapable of using a weapon; or seriously sick men.

     So a nation that maintains a standing army would perforce require that those enlisted in its ranks be young, at least moderately large and strong, patriotic, and healthy. Could such a nation afford to allow its source of important pharmaceuticals to lie outside its borders? I think not, especially considering that men at arms tend to be packed together more closely than civilians, and thus are more prone to communicating infectious conditions.

     A nation can afford to allow the manufacture of many things to lie outside its borders. Consumer electronics; video games; durians; T-shirts – all very well. But a nation that has enemies, or that has had them recently enough to imagine that it might have them again one day, cannot afford to allow the requirements of maintaining an adequate armed force to be withheld from it.


     Maximum economic efficiency does require that goods be made under those conditions where their price to the consumer will be minimized. This is a basic tenet of free-market economics. For example, if your T-shirts are being made by PhDs in physics, they’re likely to be prohibitively expensive, and thus will sell poorly. Alternately, if they’re being made by relatively unschooled, low-skilled workers, then all other things being equal they’ll be more affordable, and will sell much better. Of course, “all other things” are seldom equal, as companies that have tried to save money by exporting their software development and support activities to foreign lands have learned. Still, the core observation remains sound.

     But economic efficiency is merely one desideratum among many. It’s not nearly as important as life, freedom, or national sovereignty. In a world where two hundred quarrelsome States constantly vie to impose their wills on one another, in some contexts economic efficiency must defer to national preparedness. While this is maximally clear during wartime, even in times of widespread peace it never quite fades away. We’ve received a lesson in this from the Wuhan coronavirus, a.k.a. the Kung Flu or the Chi-Com Crud.

     Once the processes for manufacture and quality control have been sufficiently refined and automated, the production of most drugs can be relegated to less-educated, less-skilled workforces. That doesn’t make it a wise policy to allow the complete export of production to other lands. No, not even other lands that have been allies of long standing. Yet we have permitted exactly that to occur. With biological warfare concepts rising ever higher in sophistication, the notion approaches madness.

     The lives and well-being of Americans have depended for some time on drugs whose production lies outside our borders. Much of that production resides in Communist China, with which the U.S. is currently at loggerheads over trade, currency manipulation, and intellectual-property matters. This, to put it gently, is not good.

     Perhaps we are fortunate that as mild an affliction as the Chi-Com Crud appears to be has delivered the wake-up call. The openness of the world to international travel has made far worse biowar scenarios appallingly plausible. Yet some object to the reimportation of pharmaceutical production, among other things, to the United States. It will make the price of those drugs go up, they say – and they could be right. But it would be wise to remember the tale of the pork chops.


     The world market contains many thousands of internationally traded goods. We don’t often think the ones we routinely purchase and consume in a strategic context. But it’s becoming important that we learn to do so. The counterpoised thesis, the condemnation of autarky, still has merit; just not in all contexts and things.

     A large part of the reason so much physical production has left the U.S. is over-regulation in pursuit of some unattainable goal: typically, “perfectly clean” air or water. There’s nothing that’s currently made abroad that can’t be made by Americans in American workplaces. Fanatical “pro-environment” regulations are often the reason some operation has gone offshore.

     Thankfully, President Trump understands this and is doing what he can, as fast as he can, to correct the situation. With luck and the good sense not to be terrified away from this eminently sensible policy by terms like autarky and protectionism, we’ll get back to a tolerable level of pharmaceutical self-sufficiency soon enough. The consequences of not doing so could be grave, including the specter of having to conduct a war by un-warlike means.

     Verbum sat sapienti.

Monday, October 3, 2016

The Wages Of Weakness

     “Wars are caused by undefended wealth.” – Douglas MacArthur.

     Does it seem to you, Gentle Reader, that the whole world is mobilizing? That the large military powers – other than the United States, that is – are flexing their muscles for the rest of the world to see? That the relatively low international tensions of just a decade or two ago are mere memories fading before the threats of an ever more militarized present?

     Yes, even during the Bush I and II years we had some troubles. However, they were not international troubles. I’ve emphasized that word twice now. Perhaps you can see why.

     The correlation of rising international militarism and aggressive gestures by Russia, China, and their proxies with the decline of American military power and assertiveness is so strong that it cannot be overlooked. The lesson is there for anyone with eyes to see and a mind that will accept the verdict.

     Very few persons – surprisingly to some, more than zero, but still very few – actually look forward to war. Soldiers dislike the prospect more than civilians. Of course they do! Theirs are the lives most immediately endangered by warfare. You’d see no acknowledgement of that in the statements of Leftists, of course. To them, the very existence of a capable military is prima facie evidence that someone, somewhere is hoping for a war.

     I’m well acquainted with both human stupidity and the prevalence of wishful thinking. Far too many persons see only what they want to see...even if it isn’t there. But the Left’s habitual condemnation of the military, to say nothing of its hostility to weaponry, reflects so much stupidity (among the rank and file), and expresses so much hypocrisy (among their well-protected “leaders”) that contemplating it brings me near to the point of nausea.

     General MacArthur had the right of it.


     Violence of any sort is fueled by one of two motives:

  • Passion;
  • Profit.

     Now and then these will blend: i.e., the rulers of a nation will succeed in whipping the hoi polloi into a passionate war frenzy from which those rulers and their cronies hope to profit, whether politically, materially, or in some combination. But one or the other motive will always be present.

     Throughout history, the majority of military aggressions have been animated by the profit motive: nation-states’ version of an armed robbery. And really, how plausible would any other motive be? While personal animus could conceivably account for some of the tiny wars that took place between pre-Westphalian nobles, ever since that time warfare has been the province of the nation-state.

     States do not go to war over affronts to “their dignity.” Even in such cases as the War of Jenkins’ Ear, it’s beyond question that the profit motive lurked behind the seeming willingness of the British Parliament to “get angry” at Spanish coast guards’ treatment of Robert Jenkins, an acknowledged smuggler.

     To make the inception of a war appear potentially profitable, there must be loot in prospect. For States, the loot is almost always territory, its inhabitants, and its other resources. If such a prize appears to be inadequately protected by military power, the temptation can become too great to resist.

     When there are a few Great Powers and many lesser ones, all that restrains the Great from preying on the lesser is the possibility that the other Greats will respond. When such a response is deemed unlikely, the probability of military predation rises toward the tipping point. Indeed, the Great Powers might even enter into a quiet alliance for the divvying up of the world into “spheres of influence:” a polite term for a region in which a dominant nation treats the others as de facto clients, if not hostages to its will. That was approximately the case during the Nineteenth Century.

     Such is the geostrategic situation in the world of today.


     From about 1990 to about 2010, the military power and strategic alertness of the United States deterred Russia and Red China from undertaking any military predations. I need not go into gruesome detail about what’s happened since then. Nor should any Gentle Reader of Liberty’s Torch need a meticulous exegesis of the consequences of our diminution.

     Not being a fan of America’s “world policeman” role, I’ve often been of divided mind about recent developments. On the one hand, we’re less prone to inserting our olfactory apparatus into the troubles of faraway places than ever before. On the other, aggressive militarism, international violence, and the probability of more are more widespread than they’ve been since World War II. That’s not merely because we’ve refrained from flexing our own might.

     The postwar era in which the U.S. did explicitly extend “security guarantees” to many other nations (and implicitly to most of the rest) saw the world’s lesser states draw down their own self-protective capabilities, largely by attrition. This was most visible in Western Europe, where governmental expenditures on military preparedness dwindled year after year in favor of increased funding for ever more lavish welfare states. In effect, the U.S. assumed the burden of Europe’s defense that the European states abandoned. Despite our seemingly relaxed posture in this year of Our Lord 2016, the European states continue to assume that should hostilities break out, “America will take care of it.” That pattern was replicated to a more modest extent among the non-Communist nations of the Western Pacific, despite the steadily growing threat from expansionist Red China.

     That the empire-minded Putin regime over Russia and the territory-and-resources-hungry rulers of Red China have reacted by expanding their ambitions – and acting on them ever more assertively – should surprise no one. Why so many Americans express shock and dismay over these developments indicates that far too many of us have never realized that, among states as among men, “you get what you pay for.”


     This is a subject I dislike to belabor. It seems too obvious – that a detailed expansion on the mechanisms would constitute an insult to my Gentle Readers’ intelligence. However, the correctives are less than obvious – and more imperative than ever before in modern history.

     First and most immediate, the incoming administration in 2017 must make explicit America’s withdrawal from the “world policeman” role. That would include declaring expiration dates for our security guarantees under the North Atlantic Charter and any other relevant treaties. A Trump Administration would be more amenable to this than a Clinton Administration would be. Nevertheless, the need is unyielding. Strategic and military advisors must press the need upon whoever takes possession of the Oval Office.

     Second, the states of Europe and the Western Pacific must be encouraged to the verge of compulsion to form regional mutual-defense alliances. The states of Europe must revitalize their militaries. Those with nuclear capability must act to ensure their readiness, which has become dubious in recent years. One or two others – Germany comes to mind – must acquire such capabilities, preferably under American supervision.

     The states of the Western Pacific Rim have a harder row to hoe. Japan, Taiwan, and Australia require the protection of a nuclear arsenal. Nothing else will deter Red China. Perhaps they could form a “multi-lateral force” of the sort the U.S. once contemplated forming with our Wester European protectees. The alternative, of course, is for each of those nations to create its own deterrent, once again, under American supervision and with American assistance.

     Those who are reflexively opposed to the “proliferation” of “weapons of mass destruction” will of course bridle at this notion. That’s both pointless and foolish. Proliferation is already a fact – and several of the states that have nukes are no friends of freedom. Indeed, the only thing that’s guaranteed the continued existence of Israel these past five decades has been that nation’s (only recently admitted) nuclear arsenal. Consider how swiftly Ukraine’s sovereignty has been undermined since it ceded its nuclear inventory back to Russia.

     Nuclear weapons serve the cause of peace for a simple reason: aggression-minded rulers and governments know they’re under the nuclear crosshairs. They cannot escape the personal consequences of their decisions. When nukes are part of the equation, it’s not just soldiers, sailors, and airmen whose lives are in jeopardy from a war. No other variety of weapon makes that threat more definite...or more threatening.

     Once such a rebalancing of the international military scales has been accomplished, America could relax its own military readiness somewhat – but not entirely. “Wars are caused by undefended wealth,” and America holds the greatest concentration of wealth the world has ever known. For as long as we’re free and prosperous and determined to remain so, we will need a substantial military and an intercontinental nuclear capability sufficient to deter an “armed robbery writ large.” Consider the situation the late Tom Clancy described in his novel Debt of Honor, and ask yourself how likely his fictional Durling Administration would have been to recapture the islands a freshly nuclear-armed Japan had seized, had an ingenious stratagem not succeeded in destroying those Japanese ICBMs.


     There will always be exceptions to any “rule” about the decisions and actions of armed states, and the above skein of reasoning is no exception. As I wrote in 2002 at the old Palace of Reason:

     Conflict-resolution analysts have always based their approaches on the classic, game-theoretic approaches pioneered by John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern. These men, themselves mighty geniuses, built atop the economic understandings of David Ricardo and Vilfredo Pareto. The thinking of Ricardo, Pareto, and the rest of the scholium of classical economics took its founding insights from the father of all rational economic reasoning, Adam Smith.

     From Smith to the great thinkers of RAND and Hudson, we can trace an unbroken chain of calm, reasoned analysis, all of which rested on a silent, indispensable postulate: For any given thing a contestant in a contest might want, there is a maximum price he'd be willing to pay, and no more.

     Seems unassailable, doesn't it? The contrary proposition would be that there's someone willing to pay an infinite amount for some good. That would imply that he'd be willing to sacrifice his life, the lives of all his loved ones and friends, and everything else he could manipulate, to achieve some desideratum. Insane! Who would be left to enjoy whatever it was he had purchased?

     Before Black Tuesday, no one would have entertained the notion.

     Somewhere in my time closet, I have a button that says, "If you're willing to die, you can do anything." Perhaps that's a bit of an overstatement, but it points up an unpleasant truth. The sacrifice of one's own life, which has been called "the ultimate price," will buy a lot of things that are available for no other currency. Yet the willingness to make that sacrifice contradicts the unspoken assumption of classical economics. It renders conventional methods of valuation, and the reasoning by which we use them, impotent.

     The line of thought derived from Smith, whose fullest flowering arrived with Schelling, cannot cope with decisions that incorporate a willingness to pay an unbounded price.

     It gets worse when we include the nature of the "purchase" being made by the terror masters of our time: the destruction of innocent others. I mean analytically worse. How do we reproduce, in terms accessible to the non-suicidal mind, the value a terrorist places on carnage dealt to innocent others? The best of us can barely comprehend the possibility of sacrificing our lives to protect a loved one. But to throw away life and all it holds out to us merely to visit horror upon people we don't even know? From whose demise no good can flow?

     That postulate of economic rationality is what makes it possible to think about conflict resolution at all. Once removed, even the brilliance of Thomas Schelling can't cope with the results.

     Economic rationality is indispensable to deterrence theory. Because of that there remain unsolved problems: How to deal with an economically irrational, eschatologically minded state such as Iran, whose rulers are willing to see their nation and all its people destroyed if that would bring about the destruction of Israel and the emergence of the “twelfth imam,” for instance.

     Food for thought.

Saturday, August 6, 2016

The Most Awful Day, 102nd Anniversary

     [This piece first appeared at Eternity Road on August 6, 2005. Today being the 102nd -- yes, the 102nd -- anniversary of the day I deem “most awful” in post-Industrial Revolution history, and a number of geopolitical trends having bent in the direction of large-scale replays thereof, I felt it appropriate to repost it. -- FWP]


     On August 6, the anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, it's your Curmudgeon's habit to reflect on the terrible decisions that led to that event, and to ponder whether any of them might have been made differently if their makers had had foreknowledge of the things that we of this time have experienced. He's done so before, and will probably do so again.

     But not today.

     Quite a number of commentators have characterized August 6, 1945, when the Enola Gay killed Hiroshima and 130,000 of its mostly civilian residents, as the most awful day in the history of the world: the day humanity exhibited both its ability and its willingness to annihilate itself in toto. It was an awful day, to be sure, but not for that reason. As of that day, we did not have the power to destroy ourselves that completely. Nor do we have it yet today, the dire mutterings of darker souls notwithstanding.

     It was an awful day because, in the opinion of President Truman and his key advisors, the atomic bombing of a Japanese city was the least bad of the available tactical choices. Every other means by which they might force the Japanese to surrender had a higher total casualty figure attached. One, the amphibious invasion of the Japanese Home Islands by American troops, had been estimated to produce a million American deaths, to say nothing of how many Japanese would have died in the fighting.

     There's no way to revisit that crucial moment in history and supply those decision makers with the foreknowledge of the next sixty years. Even if one could, there's no way to know whether it would have made a difference: in the decision they reached, or in the relative quality of the six decades since then. All one can say with certainty is that it was an awful day indeed, one we would certainly have averted if a less awful alternative had presented itself.

     But what, then, was the most awful day? If Hiroshima doesn't take the trophy, what human atrocity could?

     Opinions will vary, of course. Some will go by casualty figures; others by broader and more inclusive metrics. Some will argue that calamities other than wars ought to be included in our considerations; others will reply that Nature is indifferent to human concerns, and that only Man's inhumanities to Man should qualify for condemnation.

     Your Curmudgeon's angle on the matter is, as you might expect, an unusual one.

     The Biblical story of Genesis, which your Curmudgeon considers allegorical rather than a literal narration of Creation and the Fall of Man, speaks plainly yet powerfully of the deed of Cain: the archetypal murder propelled by that deadliest of sins, envy. Note that, by the Biblical account, the Fall was an accomplished fact. Man had already been exiled from Eden. Many an analyst would say that Cain's deed was therefore inevitable; once separated from Divine guidance, someone had to be the first to spill human blood. The use of Cain, the allegorical first child of a woman's loins, as the protagonist in the story merely emphasizes the immediacy of the peril in which Man had placed himself by the Fall.

     That approach to the event has considerable substance. Once Man had been removed from the realm of the eternal and unchanging, all possible changes, both for good and for evil, impinged upon him. Murder was only the most dramatic.

     Shall we look forward in time, then? He who considers the number of deaths to be the most important measure would look to the genocides of the century past, or to the deaths of millions in our mass wars. These were genuinely horrible, doubt it not. But to your Curmudgeon, comparing the heights of mounds of flesh tends to miss the point.

     The history of Man's political and moral development records many fits and starts. Some of these are shrouded behind thick veils of time, such that we of 2005 cannot be certain how many persons, or which nations, were affected by them. But we can be reasonably certain about the Enlightenment and the moral revolution it ignited, for it remains with us today. Indeed, as our contest with the savageries of Islam should illustrate, Enlightenment concepts of rights and justice remain the most powerful and critical moral propositions known to our race.

     The wars of pre-Enlightenment Europe were as savage as anything of any other time, our own included. Armed men regularly targeted and slew the unarmed when it suited them to do so. What differed was the technology available. To deal death, one had to employ personal skill and exert muscle power, which limited the amount of carnage a single man or a single army could wreak. But there can be little doubt that, had the weapons of now been available to the warriors of then, they would have used them without scruple. The moral level of the time was too low to expect otherwise.

     With Enlightenment moral philosophy and the associated political concepts came a great change in warfare: the conviction that the destruction of war ought to be limited solely to those who elected to participate. As those concepts permeated the nations of the West, many of the ancient practices of war -- enslavement, rapine, looting, the slaughter of non-combatants, the use of non-conbatants as cover or "human shields" -- were put under the cloak of the forbidden, to be scorned by decent warriors and punished by them as they were discovered.

     The West saw two centuries of steady improvement in the moral constraints on warfare. Battles came to be ever more regular, ever better confined to a designated, delimited field of conflict. Many battles were actually scheduled; meeting places and times were agreed upon beforehand between the contending forces. Statesmen and thinkers looked forward to a time when death itself might be banished from the battlefield, as an obsolete practice irrelevant to true contests of strength and virtue between the governments of civilized lands.

     Until one terrible day in August.

     A government with evil intentions had sent two million men marching on a mission of conquest. Its liege lord and top military planners were angry at the stubbornness of a minor power, neutral by treaty, that refused those armies free passage through its lands. The conquest-minded state decided on a strategy of intimidation. An aircraft long kept in reserve was sent aloft on a mission of terror, the first since Hume, Smith, and Locke put their stamp on the moral renaissance of the world.

     The aircraft was a Zeppelin, designated the "L-Z" by the commanders of the armies of the German Empire under Kaiser Wilhelm II. Its weapons were gravity bombs, thirteen in number. Its target was the Belgian city of Liege, where the Kaiser's troops had met unexpected resistance to their Schlieffen Plan thrust against France. Its harvest was nine civilian lives: the first civilians deliberately killed by authorized military action in the Twentieth Century.

     The date was August 6, 1914.

     That, to your Curmudgeon's way of thinking, was the most awful day. The day a major Western power, nominally committed to individual rights, the rule of law, and the norms of civilized warfare, threw all of that aside in hope of imposing its will on the government of another land. The day the line between combatants and civilians was erased.

     That line has not yet been redrawn. Perhaps it never will be.

     No material advantage can compensate for the sacrifice of a principle. An inflexible, inviolable principle is a safeguard against villainy, a shield behind which ordinary man untouched by the irrationalities and passions of others can conduct peaceable lives in whatever degree of comfort they can contrive. But once a principle has been violated, it protects no one. Often the first violator is ultimately saddest of all over its loss.

     We stand ninety-one years down the river of time from that most awful day. America, braced by its unmatched military power and technology, has regained its grasp on the principles of civilized warfare, but the forces we face have no interest in the notion. It would be a high irony if, having clambered so painfully from the pit of Hell Mankind excavated with the mass slaughters of the century past, we should once again unlearn all virtue under the tutelage of our Islamic foes. It would be an irony to defeat all others if the lesson should eventuate in their complete effacement from the Earth.

Monday, December 21, 2015

Unities And Disunities

     I was dithering among a dozen assorted topics for an essay when I chanced upon the following video of a brief speech by legendary thriller writer Frederick Forsyth:

     Yes, it’s about Britain and the EU, it’s sixteen minutes long, and – horror of horrors! – it’s in British English. Watch it anyway. I promise that your time won’t be wasted.


     Among the most enduring fantasies of government worshippers has been the notion of a single, all-encompassing world government. I remember being intrigued by the idea myself, when I was much, much younger. But the aspect of the proposition that’s remained with me over the subsequent half-century is the way its proponents always characterized it as “inevitable.” Inevitable. Remember that word. It’s the one the Left is forever using about subjects like national health insurance. Its sole purpose is to silence, or at least weaken, resistance to the “inevitable” idea.

     In that most feared and despised of all venues for the clash of ideas, Reality, nothing is inevitable but death. Yet thinkers such as Bertrand Russell repeatedly promoted the idea of a world government as “inevitable,” mainly because they disliked or distrusted the Westphalian nation-state. Leftists’ ardor for the idea is understandable, as their dislike of small, independent polities free to deviate from their designs is a continuous thread through the history of collectivism. Yet even some intelligent men on the side of freedom, such as A. E. Van Vogt, have said that a single world government would be preferable to an array of independent nation-states.

     As passionate as the world-government camp has been, its leading lights have acknowledged, albeit grudgingly, that “you can’t get there in one step.” The League of Nations and the United Nations have demonstrated the difficulties rather starkly. So they’ve promoted regional federations and similar alliances as an intermediate state. The most recent sally in that direction is the European Union.

     The strains being put on Europe as a result of the EU have made unbelievers out of many Europeans who were once strongly in favor of complete, continental political unification. The sense that “we ought to have known better” is becoming ever stronger, especially in those countries that have suffered economically or have experienced significant cultural dilution as a consequence of the EU’s no-internal-borders policy. British sentiment for a complete withdrawal from the EU is strong and rising. Whether it will attain majority status, and whether the British political class would respect a majority vote to leave the EU, remain to be seen.


     What creates a stable polity? It’s a question without a definitive answer. Polities have formed and dissolved in innumerable ways over the centuries. There have always been arguments about the reasons for both, and there always will be.

     A single common language has been regarded as indispensable. Yet the bloodiest and most brutal wars in history have been civil wars, in which the sides shared a single language. Borders demarcated by Nature have been extolled as a critical factor, yet nations have come together without or despite such borders. Race, uniformity of technological attainment, cultural or ideological commonalities...the list goes on. No one really knows.

     What appears to be well established is that an enduring political union cannot be imposed “from above:” i.e., by the will of a political elite upon an averse population. Such a polity can only be held together by military force, and once a sufficient fraction of the subject population is determined to rebel, there’s no amount of force that can keep it together.

     The EU was formed by its political class, against the will of a fraction of the people of Europe that verged on a majority. It might well be to the EU’s advantage that there is no military force capable of perpetuating it. That will make the process of dissolution a good deal faster and more peaceful than it would otherwise be. Should the British vote themselves out, and should the British political class respect the referendum, all Brussels will be able to say is “goodbye and good luck to you.”

     I predict that should Britain depart the EU, Ireland will follow just behind it, Irish notions of independence from their British cousins notwithstanding.


     Among writers of fantasy and science fiction, few names are nearly as honored as that of the late Poul Anderson. Many of his novels and stories were either politically themed or bore important political subtexts. I consider the most powerful and thoughtful of them to be his Hugo Award winning novelette No Truce With Kings, which concerns an attempt by an alien race to “encourage” Mankind toward a world government. Here’s the climactic confrontation between one of the aliens and a representative, not of a particular state (though he is that), but of the human impulse toward self determination:

     “Listen, listen,” the being pleaded. “We came in love. Our dream was to lead you—to make you lead yourselves—toward peace, fulfillment...oh yes, we would also gain, gain yet another race with whom we could someday converse as brothers. But there are many races in the universe. It was chiefly for your own tortured sakes that we wished to guide your future.”
     “That controlled history notion isn’t original with you,” Speyer grunted. “We’ve invented it for ourselves now and then on Earth. The last time it led to the Hellbombs. No, thanks!”
     “But we know! The Great Science predicts with absolute certainty—”
     “Predicted this?” Speyer waved a hand at the blackened room.
     “There are fluctuations. We are too few to control so many savages in every detail. But do you not wish an end to war, to all your ancient sufferings? I offer you that for your help today.”
     “You succeeded in starting a pretty nasty war yourselves,” Speyer said.
     The being twisted its fingers together. “That was an error. The plan remains the only way to lead your people toward peace. I, who have traveled between suns, will get down before your boots and beg you—”
     “Stay put!” Speyer flung back. “If you’d come openly, like honest folk, maybe you’d have found some to listen to you. Maybe enough, even. But no, your do-gooding had to be subtle and crafty. We weren’t entitled to any say in the matter. God in heaven, I’ve never heard anything so arrogant!”
     The being lifted its head. “Do you tell children the whole truth?”
     “As much as they’re ready for.”
     “Your child-culture is not ready to hear these truths.”
     “Who qualified you to call us children—besides yourselves?”
     “How do you know you are adult?”
     “By trying adult jobs and finding out if I can handle them. Sure, we make some ghastly blunders, we humans. But they’re our own. And we learn from them. You’re the ones who won’t learn, you and that damned psychological science you were bragging about, that wants to fit every living mind into the one frame it can understand.
     “You wanted to re-establish the centralized state, didn’t you? Did you ever stop to think that maybe feudalism is what suits man? Some one place to call our own, and belong to, and be part of; A community with traditions and honor; a chance for the individual to make decisions that count; a bulwark for liberty against the central overlords, who’ll always want more and more power; a thousand different ways to live. We’ve always built supercountries, here on Earth, and we’ve always knocked them apart again. I think maybe the whole idea is wrong. And maybe this time we’ll try something better. Why not a world of little states, too well rooted to dissolve in a nation, too small to do much harm—slowly rising above petty jealousies and spite, but keeping their identities—a thousand separate approaches to our problems. Maybe then we can solve a few of them...for ourselves!”
     “You will never do so,” the being said. “You will be torn in pieces all over again.”
     “That’s what you think. I think otherwise. But whichever is right—and I bet this is too big a universe for either of us to predict—we’ll have made a free choice on Earth. I’d rather be dead than domesticated.”

     Perhaps the imminent fragmentation of the EU will provide another lesson of that sort. Concerning the implications for the future of these United States, I prefer to reserve judgment.

Thursday, August 8, 2013

The Pact: An Exegesis

When I write something like "The Pact," I often feel as is I'm indulging a personal need: a yearning for an unrealizable fantasy world populated by superhumans and heroes. There's some truth to that. My protagonists are usually larger than life. I prefer to leave the dreary musings upon the fancies and failings of ordinary folk to the "literary" set.

All the same, a story such as "The Pact" expresses an important insight, one that today's gray heads of international relations and diplomacy will not suffer to be mentioned in their presence:

In relations between nation-states,
Power and the will to use it are all that matter.

Statesmen dispute this at their peril.


Power -- the capacity to compel, prohibit, and expropriate by the use of force and / or intimidation -- is the antipodes of freedom.

It's not as widely known as it should be that the Founding Fathers were extremely reluctant to permit the federal government a standing army. Standing armies had been for centuries the bane of the common people of Europe. They were seldom used in "defense of the realm," but rather as instruments of oppression and depredation against the very populations that were taxed to fund them. When Article I of the Constitution was finalized, the major reactions against it, from within the Convention and from persons outside privy to its deliberations, was that allowing Congress both the taxing power and the power to maintain a standing army constituted an obvious threat to the people's newly won liberty.

Hearken to Patrick Henry, orating to the Virginia Convention:

Congress, by the power of taxation, by that of raising an army, and by the control of the militia, has the sword in one hand and the purse in the other. Shall we be safe without either? Congress have an unlimited power over both; they are entirely given up by us. Let him candidly tell me where and when did freedom exist, when the sword and the purse were given up by the people? Unless a miracle in human affairs interposed, no nation ever retained liberty after giving up the sword and the purse.

Yet in a world partitioned into quarrelsome nation-states, each poised and ready to encroach upon the territory and prerogatives of the others, no security is possible without a substantial military establishment. Indeed, the much-discussed condition we call sovereignty is a consequence of the possession of such an establishment. A nation without the power to enforce its borders is not and cannot be sovereign. It exists solely at the sufferance of other nation, and will cease to exist upon the instant another nation perceives advantage in molesting it.

So long as nation-states exist, there will be standing armies, and navies, and air forces, and strategic deterrents, and war colleges to train their commanders, and intelligence establishments to inform them, and squabbles over just how much military the nation needs and can afford. A nation whose people are largely free and want to remain so must accept that, or confront the loss of all freedom to the first predatory nation under whose lustful gaze it comes.

Military fiction author Tom Kratman, in his recent novel Countdown: H Hour, put it most memorably:

"People band into nations, real nations -- not travesties like TCS, gangs that fancy themselves nations -- to defend themselves. It requires an emotional commitment. The limits of nations are not how far their borders can reach, but how far their hearts can. People with tiny hearts, people like TCS, can never reach very far, can never gather enough similar hearts together to defend themselves. Only real people, and real countries or causes, can do that."

There's more wisdom in those seventy-six words than in the entire Congressional Record.


If we go solely by the size and capabilities of its military establishment, the United States is the most powerful nation in the world, indeed in all of history. But capability is not enough; it must be mated to the willingness to use it when the occasion demands it.

When I had President Stephen Graham Sumner say:

“The United States has seldom played the diplomacy game as well as your nation, Ambassador....We have this problem, you see. We’re habitually honest with others, even when those others have displayed no penchant for honesty themselves....But in the usual case, once we’ve discovered that we’d been lied to, we ceased to talk. I dare say you’d rather we kept talking, wouldn’t you, Ambassador? Considering the alternatives, that is?”

...he was articulating one of our severest deficiencies in international dealings: our desire to accept the other party as sincere in all his representations. We don't rise above that desire nearly as often as we should. In a typical diplomatic interchange between nations, the sincerity level seldom rises above 25% and never reaches 50%. Yet our diplomats habitually take the other fellow's word as reliable and sincere.

[If you'd like to read more about Sumner and his rise to power, go here.]

That desire to believe the other guy good-hearted has been our undoing on several occasions. We'd probably have fought half as many wars had our diplomats managed to pull off their rose-colored glasses at the appropriate times. That includes those occasions when the diplomat in question was the president of the United States.

A provocation such as the one described in "The Pact" is a probe: an exercise undertaken specifically for the purpose of eliciting a response to be analyzed. The aggressor nation seeks to gauge its target's willingness to court open conflict. If the will is there, the probe is unlikely to be repeated; if not, further, deeper probes are guaranteed, possibly culminating in a full-scale war.

“Probe with a bayonet: if you meet steel, stop. If you meet mush, then push.” -- V. I. Lenin

Whatever his failings as an economist, Lenin understood the dynamic that governs international relations.


Along with the view of international relations I've explicated above, I had another goal in mind with "The Pact:" to depict the conduct I want to see in a president of the United States when confronted with an aggressive probe. In recent years, only John F. Kennedy has exhibited firmness anywhere near that -- and he had to suffer a number of painful international humiliations to convince him that a strong stance was necessary if the U.S. was to thwart the threat posed by Soviet nuclear-armed IRBMs in Cuba.

A president with Stephen Graham Sumner's grasp of reality and a strength of will to match it would be a hero of a sort we haven't had since long before Kennedy -- and Americans are starving to death for a genuine national hero. The parade of sports poseurs and celebrities "famous for being famous" has failed to nourish us, as we should have realized.

In my view, any man who accepts the duties and responsibilities of Commander-In-Chief has made a pact with the nation that elevated him: to represent its interests fearlessly and in full confidence that the government, the military, and the people are wholly behind him. Many a president has failed not just one of those criteria but all of them.

Yet it was not always so. Before World War II, even men who disputed the wisdom of this or that international sally, or of our entry into this or that conflict, would close ranks behind the government while negotiations progressed, and behind our forces when a decision to go to war was reached. The presidents of those times could wage both diplomacy and war in confidence -- justified confidence.

May it be so again...and may we have presidents worthy of such wholehearted support.